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THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE NCAA’S 






     The NCAA is violating § 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly 
power through an exclusionary scheme.1 This article analyzes the NCAA’s 
exclusionary conduct and the unique structure of the NCAA’s “student-athlete” 
model. Whether the NCAA as an entity qualifies as a single entity with unitary 
decision-making and aggregate economic power, or as a combination of 
multiple entities conspiring together,2 the end result is the same. Under either 
conception of the entity structure or either section of the Sherman Act, the 
underlying acts taken by the NCAA violate federal antitrust law. This article 
will follow a standard § 2 monopolization theory and will propose viable 
alternatives for the NCAA’s current model that emphasize the anticompetitive 
nature of the NCAA’s tactics. 
     Under the Grinnell monopolization test, a firm that possesses monopoly 
power and uses exclusionary acts to maintain that monopoly power has violated 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.3 Here, the NCAA has used exclusionary acts to set its 
labor costs unreasonably low in order to maintain a monopoly on the college-
 
 Taylor Skaggs is an associate at the New York office of Seward & Kissel LLP in their Corporate Finance 
department. He graduated cum laude from Boston University School of Law, and holds a bachelor's degree in 
Economics and a bachelor's degree in English Writing from the University of Pittsburgh. 
     1  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2020) (defining exclusionary scheme as “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
     2 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 193 (2010) (holding that NFL teams, while all 
part of a larger consortium, are independent actors and thus can conspire amongst themselves to violate 
antitrust laws). 
     3 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
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level athlete market. Labor costs for the purposes of this paper are defined as 
the amount of compensation paid (including injury-liability avoided) to college-
level athletes, which are athletes of the requisite age and skill necessary to 
compete in college basketball and football. As such, the NCAA has created an 
exclusionary scheme whereby the NCAA depresses the labor costs that would 
otherwise be due in a competitive market through predatory tactics, eliminating 
competitors from the market, and the NCAA recoups monopoly profits through 
the maintenance of its monopoly power. 
I. THE NCAA’S COST SCHEME CONSTITUTES AN EXCLUSIONARY ACT IN 
VIOLATION OF THE GRINNELL MONOPOLIZATION TEST 
    The traditional framework for a § 2 monopolization claim can be found in the 
Grinnell case, where the Supreme Court held that  
 
the offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.4  
 
This paper will analyze the monopolization test by examining a unique 
exclusionary cost scheme: the NCAA, through exclusionary tactics, has made 
its labor cost so unreasonably low that no competitor paying market wages can 
compete with the NCAA in the college-level athlete market, thereby eliminating 
competition and ensuring maintenance of monopoly power and profits. 
     The Supreme Court has emphasized that as a general rule, lower production 
costs “either reflect[] the lower cost structure of the alleged [monopolist], and 
so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a 
judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling 
legitimate price cutting.”5 Similarly, the Court has steadfastly held that price 
discrimination is often a natural part of “vigorous competition” and “to hold that 
the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price 
competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices 
in order to increase market share.”6 However, the general rule that lower 
production costs merely reflect a lower cost structure only applies to firms that 
 
     4 Id.  
     5 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (referring to P. 
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720c (Supp. 1992)).  
     6 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986). 
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can improve their production costs through better management or improved 
efficiency. Here, the NCAA does not manufacture or produce physical goods; 
there is no technological advancement or efficient technique that it has 
implemented to lower costs. Rather than the result of “growth or development 
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,”7 
the NCAA’s minimal labor costs merely reflect the use of exclusionary acts. 
The NCAA’s unreasonably low costs are not legitimate price competition and 
result from predatory tactics that allow the NCAA to not pay its labor a 
reasonable market rate.  
     As the Department of Justice points out, the purpose of § 2 of the Sherman 
Act is to promote economic growth and societal wealth.8 As such, 
monopolization claims run the risk of punishing efficient firms that have gained 
market share from inefficient rivals.9 However, the NCAA, through its 
exclusionary cost structure, has created the type of harmful monopoly, with high 
monopoly prices and reduced supply, that the Sherman Act aims to prevent.10 
In other words, the NCAA’s monopoly has arisen and been maintained by 
exclusionary tactics rather than vigorous competition or efficient operations. 
A. The NCAA’s Unreasonably Low Labor Costs Allow the NCAA to 
Undermine Potential Competitors’ Price and Constitute an Exclusionary 
Act that Eliminates Competition in the Market 
 
     Showing antitrust harm is “not met by inquiring only whether the defendant 
has engaged in ‘unfair’ or ‘predatory’ tactics. Such conduct may be sufficient to 
prove the necessary intent to monopolize, which is something more than an 
intent to compete vigorously . . . .”11 Similarly, low costs that are set as “an act 
of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without 
more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.”12 The purpose of the 
Sherman Act is concerned “with the protection of competition, not 
competitors.”13 In short, antitrust injury is an “injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent. . . . The injury should reflect the anticompetitive 
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the 
violation.”14 
 
     7 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571. 
      8 U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT AND SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: AN OVERVIEW (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-1 
(updated June 25, 2015). 
      9 Id. 
     10 See id. 
     11 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). 
     12 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993). 
    13 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
     14 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
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     Here, the NCAA has created a pool of functionally free labor through its 
exclusionary scheme,15 which allows the NCAA complete dominance of the 
college-level athletics market. As a result, both the requisite exclusionary 
conduct and subsequent harm to competition exists in the relevant market (i.e., 
college-level basketball and football). As a factual matter, no other entity 
supplies college-level athletics to consumers; the NCAA is, both literally and 
figuratively, the only game in town. More specifically, the NCAA is a 
monopsony, and the NCAA’s restriction on college-level athlete compensation 
reduces competition in the market, causing antitrust harm.16 Other entities exist 
in the high school (pre-college) athletics market.17 Likewise, competitors exist 
in the professional (post-college) athletics market.18 However, in the college-
level athletics market, no other competitors exist, nor can any competitors enter.  
     Consider the plight of a potential competitor (e.g., public sports-apparel 
companies like Nike, Adidas, or Under Armour) that attempts to enter the 
market. Potential competitors cannot force college-level athletes to work for 
free.19 Nor is it reasonable to expect college-level athletes to voluntarily work 
for a sports-apparel company without pay. As an anecdotal case, New Balance, 
a private footwear company, recently agreed to pay a highly-recruited college-
level basketball player $1 million for a three-month internship to not play 
basketball at all.20 Consequently, a competitor will have to compensate athletes 
for their services. As the recent college basketball scandal has shown, certain 
college-level basketball players are worth at least $100,000, as well as risking 
the potential negative consequences from NCAA sanctions and criminal bribery 
charges, for one year of play.21 Regardless of the exact determination of what 
constitutes a reasonable market rate for college-level basketball and football 
players, that compensation will undoubtedly be greater than zero.  
     Under basic economic theory, a profit-maximizing company in a competitive 
market will set its price no lower than its cost.22 At any valuation of a college-
 
     15 See infra pp. 11–16 (discussing NCAA’s free labor pool in depth).  
     16 See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2015). 
     17 See History, Heritage & Tradition, MCDONALD’S ALL AM., https://www.mcdonaldsallamerican.com/aag/en-
us/history.html (last visited July 5, 2020) (explaining the history of the McDonald’s All American high school basketball 
competition); History, UNDER ARMOUR FOOTBALL, http://uafootball.us/all-america-football-game/#history (last visited 
July 5, 2020). 
      18 The National Basketball Association and the BIG3 compete in professional American basketball.  At the time this paper 
was written, the National Football League and the Arena Football League were competitors in professional American 
football.  Arena Football has since filed for bankruptcy.  Scott Gleeson, Arena Football League Files for Bankruptcy, Ceases 
All Operations, USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2019/11/27/arena-football-league-
declares-bankruptcy-shuts-down/4322126002/. 
     19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
     20 Marc Stein, A New Option for NBA Prospects: The Million Dollar Intern, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/sports/darius-bazley-g-league-new-balance.html. 
     21 See Matt Norlander, Ultimate College Basketball Corruption Scandal Primer, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 
2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/ultimate-college-basketball-corruption-scandal-
primer-explaining-the-latest-with-the-fbi-probe/.  
     22 KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 9–12 (2003). 
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level athlete’s market wage rate, the potential competitor’s labor cost (defined 
as Cx) will be higher than the NCAA’s labor cost (defined as Cy) because of the 
fundamental fact that Cx  >  0, whereas Cy  ≈  0. As soon as a competitor enters 
the market, setting its price (defined as Px) equal to Cx, the NCAA can simply 
lower its price (defined as Py) to any amount marginally less than its 
competitor’s price. Due to the NCAA’s labor cost structure (Cy  ≈ 0), it will still 
make a profit at any Py > 0  and eventually drive the competitor out of business. 
Once the competition has exited, the NCAA can simply return Py to the highest 
monopoly price it can obtain. Even if a competitor were to forego short-term 
profitability in an attempt to increase market share by setting Px = Py, the end 
result would be the same. So long as Cx  > Px  but  Py > Cy, the NCAA will 
continue to turn a profit at any short-term price level that the competitor chooses. 
Therefore, no competitor can or will enter the market due to the NCAA’s cost 
scheme, and the NCAA can maintain a monopoly price indefinitely. 
     Competition in the college-level athletics market is clearly eliminated by the 
NCAA’s exclusionary tactics. However, the next question is whether such an 
exclusionary cost scheme as laid out above actually harms consumers of college 
athletics. Do consumers actually pay more for college basketball and football as 
a result of the NCAA’s low-cost scheme? The answer, under any reasonable 
point of view, must be yes. 
B. Presence of Competitors in the Market Reduces Price for Consumers While 
Simultaneously Increasing Compensation for College-Level Athletes 
 
     The Supreme Court has held that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless 
of how those prices are set,”23 and “depriving consumers of the benefits of lower 
prices . . . does not constitute sound antitrust policy.”24 In order “to be 
condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an ‘anticompetitive 
effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm 
consumers.”25 The purpose of the Sherman Act is designed “not against conduct 
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends 
to destroy competition itself.”26 In essence, an antitrust claim “must demonstrate 
that the monopolist's conduct harmed competition, not just a competitor.”27 
Here, the NCAA’s exclusionary tactics result in unreasonably low labor costs, 
but those lower costs are not passed on to the consumer in the form of a lower 
price while simultaneously maintaining the NCAA’s monopoly power. 
 
     23 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (quoting Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 329, 340 (1884)). 
     24 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 319 (2007) (quoting Brooke 
Grp., 509 U.S. at 224). 
     25 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
     26 Spectrum Sports Inc., v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
     27 Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59. 
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     Though the NCAA is a non-profit organization,28it is most definitely not a 
charity. The NCAA is a profit-maximizing entity; it will set its price at the 
highest profit-maximizing level. Consider, as an example, the NCAA’s sale of 
media rights for the men’s annual championship basketball tournament. The 
NCAA recently extended its contract with two media companies, Columbia 
Broadcasting System and Turner Broadcasting System, by eight years for a total 
of $8.8 billion (starting in 2024) for the rights to broadcast the tournament.29 No 
other entity can offer college-level basketball to consumers, but there are 
numerous media conglomerates willing to purchase the media rights for NCAA 
basketball. No serious argument can be made that the NCAA sold its men’s 
basketball tournament rights to the lowest bidder; it clearly sold at the highest 
price offered. However, the question remains whether competitors offering 
college-level athletics would have lowered that sale price and subsequent cost 
to consumers. Such a determination can only be theoretical and counter factual, 
but the answer must be yes. 
     Economic theory posits that the presence of competitors reduces the power 
of the monopolistic firm to set a monopoly price level by providing alternatives 
for the buyer.30 In the face of competitors offering supply-side substitution, the 
monopolistic firm would be constrained from setting its price too high lest the 
buyers switch to the competitors.31 Regardless of the NCAA’s underlying cost 
structure, new competitors will at least cause a marginal decrease in price as a 
hedge against consumers substituting one product (NCAA basketball or 
football) for a potentially cheaper alternative (Nike basketball or Under Armour 
football). 
     Similarly, the practical implications of competitors in the market suggests 
that the NCAA would have to reduce its price. If competitors enter the market, 
one can assume that the NCAA’s monopoly power and exclusionary cost 
structure has dissipated and college-level athletes are now receiving market 
compensation for their services. In essence, there can be no competitors while 
the NCAA maintains its free labor source (as examined in the preceding 
section); therefore, the presence of competitors implies the absence of the 
NCAA’s free labor pool. In such a scenario, the NCAA’s cost has increased to 
the market rate, but an increase in labor cost does not imply a higher price to 
consumers. An increase in labor cost would lead to an increase in price only 
when that cost increase exceeds the market price level. Rather, the presence of 
competitors would merely force the NCAA to forego its monopoly profits 
through an increase in labor cost to the market rate and a reduction from the 
 
     28 Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last visited July 5, 2020). 
     29  Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Extends Basketball Deal with CBS Sports and Turner Through 2032, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-extends-basketball-deal-
with-cbs-sports-and-turner-through-2032.html.  
     30 Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52. 
     31 See HYLTON, supra note 22, at 232–36. 
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monopolist price to the competitive price level. Without a price reduction, the 
new competitors, who are operating at some price level less than the monopoly 
price charged by the NCAA, would siphon some, if not all, the business of the 
broadcasting companies. Given that the NCAA’s annual labor cost for college-
level athletes is functionally zero and it sold the media rights for an annual 
tournament at a rate of $1.1 billion per year,32 there is an enormous amount of 
monopoly profits to spread around and increase labor costs while 
simultaneously reducing sale price.  
     Per the NCAA’s 2017 Financial Report, the total amount in expenses 
(excluding labor of the athletes, which naturally does not appear as an expense) 
required to operate all of its athletic infrastructure across all sports and for the 
entire fiscal year was $396 million.33 The amount of revenue derived from the 
sale of media rights and merchandise for the annual, month-long NCAA 
basketball tournaments was $981 million.34 That leaves $585 million of 
monopoly profits leftover from the current exclusionary cost structure. 
Moreover, sixty-eight college teams participated in the 2016 NCAA 
tournament.35 The NCAA allows thirteen scholarships (covering cost of 
attendance) to each of those teams.36 Together, that results in 884 college-level 
athletes competing in the tournament. The average cost of attendance (tuition, 
fees, room and board) for all four-year universities during the 2015-2016 
academic year was calculated at $27,213.37 Altogether, the 884 athletes received 
scholarships worth just north of $24 million to compete in a tournament that 
generated the NCAA $585 million in profit. In other words, an entity “is a 
monopolist if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive 
level. . . . Where evidence indicates that a firm has in fact profitably done so, 
the existence of monopoly power is clear.”38 
     Given the astronomically high profits derived by the NCAA under its current 
exclusionary cost structure, the presence of competitors and the payment of 
 
     32 See supra text accompanying note 29 
      33  See NCAA, NCAA CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2016–17 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 
5 (2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20181221210506/https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016-17NCAAFin_ 
FinancialStatement_20180129.pdf. The report lists total expenses at about $956 million, but that includes roughly $560 
million of Distribution to Division I Members. Sharing the monopoly profits with member universities, while an expense 
for accounting purposes, is not the type of expense one would usually consider when looking at production costs. Thus, 
the $560 million was subtracted from the total, resulting in $396 of actual expenses. 
     34 Id. The financial report included certain items (specifically, Investment income - net, Gain - Other, and 
Contributions) that are revenue for accounting purposes, but not useful in determining revenue from the 
production of goods and services. The $981 million figure reflects the removal of these items from the total 
revenues listed in the report. 
     35 See Division I Men’s Basketball, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.com/brackets/basketball-men/d1/2016 (last 
visited July 5, 2020).  
     36 NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 15.5.5.1 (2018) [hereinafter NCAA 2018-19 DIV. I 
MANUAL]. 
     37 See Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited July 5, 2020) [hereinafter Tuition Costs].  
     38 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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market rate wages to athletes would not increase the price to consumers. 
Similarly, the price of the media rights would undoubtedly drop given the 
supply-side substitution risk that competitors present to the NCAA. The lower 
price of media rights subsequently reduces the price paid by consumers, 
operating under a chain of reasoning where the lower price for media rights 
means lower cost to broadcasting companies, which reduces the price of 
purchasing the broadcast for the average consumer.39 
C. The NCAA Currently has Monopoly Power in the College-Level Athlete 
Market 
 
     The monopolization prong from the Grinnell monopolization test requires a 
showing of monopoly power in the relevant market.40 The Supreme Court 
defines “monopoly power as ‘the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.’”41 “When a product is controlled by one interest, without 
substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power.”42 In scenarios 
“where the market is highly diffuse and competitive, or where new entry is 
easy,” monopoly power is unlikely to occur.43  
     Little argument can be made that NCAA does not have monopoly power in 
the college-level athletics market. The Supreme Court explicitly held that the 
NCAA has market power in the relevant market:  
As a factual matter, it is evident that [the NCAA] does possess 
market power . . .  intercollegiate football telecasts generate an 
audience uniquely attractive to advertisers and that competitors 
are unable to offer programming that can attract a similar 
audience. These findings amply support [the] conclusion that 
the NCAA possesses market power.44  
 
No other entity provides a venue for college-level athletes to perform, and 
consequently, no entity can offer broadcast rights or otherwise compete with the 
NCAA. Rather than a diffuse market with readily available substitutes, the 
college athletics market is concentrated in one entity, the NCAA. Questions 
remain whether the short-run cost of the NCAA’s exclusionary scheme can be 
 
     39 This chain of reasoning relies upon basic supply and demand economic theory, but given the reputations 
of the cable conglomerates, it is unclear whether a decrease in the cost of purchasing a particular media right 
would actually result in lower cost to the subsequent consumers. This paper assumes that cable companies 
operate like normal firms in a competitive market. 
     40 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
     41 Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).  
     42 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 394.  
     43 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993). 
     44 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984). 
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borne by the NCAA and whether it can maintain its monopoly power through 
the imposition of barriers to entry on competitors and switching costs on 
college-level athletes.  
1.  The “Student-Athlete” Model Allows the NCAA to Create a Functionally 
Free Pool of Labor, Eliminating Short-Term Costs Associated with an 
Exclusionary Scheme 
 
     The term “student-athlete” was coined by the first director of the NCAA, 
Walter Byers, in an effort to avoid the classification of the relationship between 
athletes and universities as an employee-employer relationship.45 The ability of 
the NCAA to classify college-level athletes as non-employees has three 
consequences that allows the NCAA to create an exclusionary cost scheme at 
minimal or no cost to itself. 
     First, the employee-employer relationship has a great deal more protection 
than the “student-athlete” relationship, and the NCAA can avoid paying 
workers’ compensation to its athletes as a result.46 The amount of labor cost 
avoided by the “student-athlete” model is incalculable, but a few numbers to put 
the potential injury cost in perspective can be instructive. Since 2000, thirty 
college-level athletes have died while participating in NCAA football 
programs.47 From 2000 to 2016, eighty-five athletes have died while 
participating across all NCAA athletic programs.48 From 2004 to 2009, the 
NCAA calculated that 41,000 injuries occurred in football alone.49 The severity 
and extent of those injuries will obviously vary, but the sheer scale of injuries 
as well as the persistent risk of death in football alone suggests that the NCAA 
has successfully avoided massive workers’ compensation liability. As such, the 
NCAA has minimized its labor cost and subsequently minimized the burden of 
enacting its exclusionary cost scheme. 
     Second, the term “student-athlete” allows the NCAA to apply its “principle 
of amateurism” to college-level athletes who participate in NCAA athletic 
 
     45 Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/?single_page=true; See Jason Belzer, 
Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes or Employee Athletes?, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013), 
https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jasonbelzer/2013/09/09/leveling-the-playing-field-student-athletes-or-employee-athletes/.  
     46 See Branch, supra note 45; Belzer, supra note 45. 
     47 Erik Lief, 30 NCAA Football Players Have Died During Workouts Since 2000, HBO Reveals, AM. 
COUNCIL SCI. & HEALTH (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.acsh.org/news/2018/09/28/30-ncaa-football-players-
have-died-during-workouts-2000-hbo-reveals-13456.  
     48 Brian Burnsed, The Breaking Point, NCAA (2018), http://www.ncaa.org/static/champion/the-breaking-
point/.  
     49 NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA_Football_Injury_WEB.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2020).  
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programs.50 The Supreme Court has ensconced the supposed virtues of NCAA 
amateurism in the dicta of the Board of Regents case:  
 
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be no 
question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that 
the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds 
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely 
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.51  
 
The Court has rationalized the latitude provided to the NCAA to preserve 
amateurism and the “student-athlete” model by assuming (without any deeper 
analysis) “that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable 
means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore 
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate 
athletics.”52 Regardless of the soundness of the legal reasoning (or lack thereof) 
and the factual realities of college athletics in 1984, the NCAA now presides 
over a billion-dollar industry. Nonetheless, the NCAA can continue to classify 
college-level athletes as non-employee amateurs and use any means to preserve 
the “revered tradition of amateurism.” As such, the NCAA has complete control 
and an unfettered ability to regulate college-level athletes’ compensation while 
still remaining “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” The 
Court’s “respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and 
encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics”53 allows the NCAA to 
utilize a conception of amateurism that has rather nefarious consequences. As 
the Court-sanctioned safeguard of noble amateurism, the NCAA can use any 
tactics necessary to maintain amateurism while also wielding the power to 
define that very same principle. For the NCAA, amateurism supposedly means 
college-level athletes are “motivated primarily by education and by the physical, 
mental and social benefits to be derived.”54 In reality, the NCAA’s principle of 
amateurism is really an analysis of whether an athlete has competed with 
professionals, engaged representation on his behalf, or been paid for his 
services, with no consideration of whether the individual in question is 
motivated by physical or social benefits, nor whether the athlete’s primary 
motivation was for a professional career.55 In essence, the NCAA sets the 
distinction between professional athletes and amateur “student-athletes” on 
whether or not that athlete receives compensation for their efforts. The act of 
 
     50 See Branch, supra note 45; Belzer, supra note 45. 
     51 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
     52 Id. at 117. 
     53 Id. at 101. 
     54 NCAA 2018–19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 2.9. 
     55  Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism (last visited July 5, 2020). 
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refusing to pay wages to athletes is thus turned into a virtue in service of the 
noble principle of amateurism. That conception of amateurism is particularly 
peculiar when compared to the Greek origin of the amateur athlete. Amateur 
athletes in Greece competed exclusively for prizes; there was no distinction 
between professional athletes and amateur athletes because the two ideas, as 
understood in modern times, were one and the same in ancient Greece.56 
     However, since the NCAA has control over defining what constitutes an 
amateur and whether a college-level athlete satisfies those standards, the NCAA 
can (and does) prescribe the amount of wages that college-level athletes can 
receive and still be considered amateurs.57 Unsurprisingly, the amount of wages 
a college-level athlete can receive is zero.58 Query whether profiting from the 
labor of college athletes who are barred from receiving remuneration is the type 
of exploitative conduct that the NCAA ostensibly strives to protect student-
athletes from: “Student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.”59  
     Third, the amount of “compensation” the NCAA permits for college-level 
athletes does not actually result in a labor cost on the NCAA. The NCAA allows 
its member institutions to distribute a “grant-in-aid” to its athletes, which is 
equal to the financial aid cost of attendance limitation of the member university 
(i.e., tuition, fees, and room and board).60 As mentioned above, the average cost 
of attendance across four-year universities, and therefore the average 
compensation to college-level athletes, was $27,213 in 2016.61 Even if $27,213 
was considered a fair market wage and consistent with a perfectly competitive 
college athletics market, that grant-in-aid allowed by NCAA regulations is 
neither practical compensation for the athletes nor does it actually result in 
equivalent labor costs to the NCAA. In other words, the grant-in-aid does not 
functionally increase the NCAA’s labor costs above zero. 
     Consider the plight of a “student-athlete” under the NCAA’s current model 
at the University of Alabama (“Bama”).62 The grant-in-aid allowable under 
NCAA regulations for Bama athletes is either $31,080 (in-state) or $51,424 
(out-of-state).63 Per NCAA rules, Division I football programs are allowed a 
 
     56 See generally Robert Lemons, Amateurism and College Athletics (April 28, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript),https://economics.sites.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9386/f/publications/robertlemonshonorst
hesis-may2014.pdf. 
     57 NCAA 2018–19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 12.02.10. 
     58 Id. art. 12.02.11. 
     59 Id. art. 2.9. 
     60 Id. art. 12.01.4. 
     61 Tuition Costs, supra note 37. 
     62 The University of Alabama has a very large and profitable football program with publicly-available 
financial data. As such, it makes a good case study for the paper, but any public Division I member university 
would suffice.  
     63  Cost of Attendance, UNIV. ALA., https://financialaid.ua.edu/cost/ (last visited July 8, 2020).  
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maximum of eighty-five scholarship players.64 Even if every Bama football 
athlete was an out-of-state student, the total amount of grant-in-aid given to 
those players would be $4.37 million. However, Bama does not actually bear 
the cost of those scholarships. Per the 2017 financial report, Bama reported $483 
million of tuition and fees net revenue.65 That revenue surplus accounts for just 
over $237 million of scholarship expenses for all of its students (undergraduate 
and post-graduate).66 In the same year, Bama reported $243 million in state 
appropriations, federal grants, and gifts, as well as an additional $24.5 million 
of scholarship operating expenses.67 All but $19 million of Bama’s entire 
scholarship expenses could be covered by third-party entities. Even where the 
scholarship expenses are not directly covered by a third-party, Bama can recoup 
the lost income from a scholarship by simply admitting additional non-
scholarship students, or conversely, reducing the scholarship amounts it would 
have otherwise given to non-athletes. Per the same report, Bama had a full-time 
enrollment of 35,120 students.68 Given that Bama’s full allotment of football 
and basketball grant-in-aid scholarships is ninety-eight (thirteen for basketball, 
eighty-five for football), Bama need only admit ninety-eight additional students 
(an enrollment increase of 0.28%), with no scholarship allowances to erase the 
lost tuition revenue from the grant-in-aid scholarships.69 The actual labor cost 
borne by the NCAA and its member institutions is functionally zero as third-
party entities or enrollment adjustments disburse the cost. Put another way, the 
grant-in-aid scholarships result in an actual cost to the NCAA or its member 
universities only when those scholarship costs are not passed on to a different 
entity (the state government) or group (non-scholarship students).  
     As an analogy, consider what the “grant-in-aid” actually offers college-level 
athletes. Granting a full scholarship with sticker value of $27,000 to the 
“student-athlete” is similar to giving an athlete a retail gift card for $27,000. 
Yes, the gift card has a nominal value of $27,000, but the athlete can only use 
that money at the specific retailer, or in this case, paying the cost associated with 
attending an NCAA university. Since attending a member university is a pre-
requisite for competing in college athletics, the NCAA has created a system that 
requires college-level athletes to pay $27,000 to participate, then generously 
allows the member universities to cover that required expense. To highlight the 
absurdity, consider the scholarship-as-compensation model in an employee-
 
     64  NCAA 2018-19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 15.5.6.1. 
     65 See UNIV. ALA., 2016–17 FINANCIAL REPORT 21 (2018),  
https://finance-estus.fa.ua.edu/FinancialAccounting/FAPPub/UA%20Financial%20Reports/ua-financial-
report%201617.pdf.  
     66 Id.  
     67 Id. 
     68 Id. at 19.  
     69 Of course, the expenses for Bama would technically increase, but it is safe to assume that those increases 
would be marginal given that most of a university’s expenses are relatively fixed and do not vary greatly when 
a small number of additional students are enrolled. 
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employer context. An employer offers a potential employee a $27,000 salary. 
However, the employer informs the employee that working at the office requires 
a $27,000 annual workplace fee. Since the potential employee does not have 
$27,000, the employer offers to cover that $27,000 fee via a salary advance. The 
employee accepts the offer, and the employee now works the rest of the year for 
no pay since he’s already received his $27,000 salary upfront to cover the annual 
workplace fee. Has that employee “earned” $27,000? Of course not, and neither 
have the student-athletes. 
     In any event, the NCAA has created a pool of labor outside the protections 
and obligations of the typical employee-employer relationship, gained control 
over what constitutes an eligible amateur athlete with the Supreme Court’s 
blessing, and passed along any remaining labor costs to other entities. As such, 
the NCAA has minimized the compensation and wages it owes to college-level 
athletes, thereby reducing the costs of implementing its exclusionary cost 
scheme to zero while still, in fact, turning a profit from its exclusionary conduct. 
2. NCAA Regulations Create an Insurmountable Barrier to Entry for 
Competitors While Simultaneously Prohibiting Exit by Participating 
College-Level Athletes Through Enormous Switching Costs 
 
     In order for monopoly power to be maintained and monopoly price level kept 
intact, the monopolist must impose entry barriers to bar competitors from 
entering the market. “[W]ithout barriers to entry it, would presumably be 
impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.”70 Entry 
barriers can be any “factors (such as certain regulatory requirements) that 
prevent new rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the 
competitive level.”71 Furthermore, barriers to entry can exist where the 
dominant firm in the market makes entry by new competitors so prohibitively 
expensive as to completely dissuade competitors from attempting to enter the 
market.72 
     The NCAA has developed a regulatory scheme that prevents competitors 
from undercutting the NCAA’s monopoly price by imposing an insurmountable 
cost on entry. For example, the NCAA demands that all “student-athletes” that 
compete for the member institutions must abide by the NCAA regulations 
regarding benefits and awards in order to maintain eligibility.73 The NCAA 
model formally sets these restrictions to delineate between amateur athletics and 
 
     70 Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 n.15 (1986). 
     71 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
     72 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967). 
     73 NCAA 2018–19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 1.2(b)–(c), (f). 
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professional,74 but the functional distinction between amateur and professional 
athlete is whether or not an individual receives wages. More specifically, the 
NCAA sets out a list of permissible benefits that “student-athletes” are allowed 
to obtain while maintaining their amateur status, which does not include 
wages.75 The manual notes that any “student-athlete” who receives 
compensation for his athletic production has become a professional athlete and 
is no longer eligible to compete in the collegiate model.76 According to the 
NCAA, compensation for labor is by its very nature professional and 
consequently makes any athlete ineligible to compete in NCAA athletics.77 As 
such, any athlete who receives any “award, benefit or expense allowance not 
authorized by NCAA legislation renders the student-athlete ineligible for 
athletics competition in the sport for which the improper award, benefit or 
expense was received. If the student-athlete receives an extra benefit not 
authorized by NCAA legislation, the individual is ineligible in all sports.”78  
     How then can a competitor enter the market? Theoretically, a competitor 
could offer any number of college-level athletes or future college-level athletes 
(i.e., high school students) compensation and start the hypothetical Fair 
Compensation League (“FCL”). From the outset, the potential competitor faces 
two problems. As examined earlier, the NCAA has minimal labor costs, so the 
FCL now must compete with the NCAA on uneven ground. Since the FCL pays 
its players and the NCAA does not, the barrier to entry for the FCL are the very 
wages that the FCL must pay to college-level athletes in order to enter the 
market. Rather than attempting to compete against a firm with similar costs, the 
FCL will have to bear the upfront cost of paying athletes and continue to pay 
those athletes for the duration of their services. At no point in time will the FCL 
have lower labor costs than the NCAA, and no matter what price the FCL 
attempts to sell at, the NCAA will earn a higher profit. As such, the barrier to 
entry is both enormously costly and never dissipates; by paying wages, the FCL 
will always earn less than its competitor. Given the bleak prospects of earning 
a profit when competing against an entity that does not pay wages, neither the 
FCL nor any rational decisionmaker will enter the market.  
     Notwithstanding the compensation entry barrier, a second barrier arises for 
the FCL: the costs associated with creating a comparable athletic infrastructure 
with the NCAA. Without an infrastructure (i.e., facilities, stadiums, and 
coaches), the FCL cannot create a product, develop talent, or otherwise produce 
revenue. However, the FCL faces another severe disadvantage in creating an 
 
     74 See id. art. 20.9 (explaining non-binding “Commitments to Division I Collegiate Model”); see also id. 
art. 12.01.2. 
     75 See id. arts. 12.01.4, 12.02.2; see also id. at 222–23 fig.15-1. 
     76 See id. art. 12.2.5; see also id. arts. 12.02.10–12.02.11. 
     77 See id. art. 12.02.11. 
     78 See id. art. 16.01.1. 
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infrastructure. The NCAA has long been protected from antitrust suits,79 and 
that unfettered access to college-level athletes has allowed the NCAA to build 
an unparalleled athletic infrastructure. Consider that in 2014, the forty-eight 
NCAA-member universities in the five wealthiest conferences (i.e., the 
Southeastern Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference, Big 12, Big Ten, and the 
Pac-12) spent $772 million on athletic complexes.80 In 2016, some NCAA-
member universities spent over $200 million to build new stadiums.81 In 2018, 
thirteen NCAA-member universities spent $5 million or more for head football 
coaches.82 Those same universities spent, at minimum, an additional $3.6 
million for assistant head coaches.83 On top of the wage burden to compensate 
the athletes, a potential competitor must spend an enormous amount in initial 
outlay to build facilities, construct stadiums, and hire coaches. The true cost of 
such an endeavor is hard to determine, but given the small sample of capital 
spent by the NCAA and its member institutions above, an initial outlay in the 
hundreds of millions, if not billions, seems imminently plausible.   
     In the same vein, the same NCAA regulations on compensation that create 
an entry barrier for competitors create an exit barrier or switching cost on 
college-level athletes. Where “the cost of switching is high . . . [individuals] are 
thus ‘locked in.’”84 Traditionally, switching costs are attributed to customers as 
part of a tying claim. Here, the switching costs or exit barriers apply to the 
athletes when considering whether to join a competitor willing to pay wages, or 
remain with the NCAA, which does not. All else being equal, a rational 
decisionmaker would choose to be compensated over not being compensated. 
However, any currently eligible NCAA athlete who wants to join the FCL faces 
a tough choice: receive compensation for his athletic exploits and be instantly 
disqualified from competition in the NCAA, or forego compensation in favor of 
competing in the NCAA. The rules are explicitly designed to punish and deter 
athletes from deviating from the NCAA model. Consider the indefinite 
suspension for running back Todd Gurley after he received $400 to sign 
autographs85 or the four-game suspension for wide receiver A.J. Green for 
 
     79 See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
     80 Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Colleges Spend Fortunes on Lavish Athletic Facilities, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 
23, 2015), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-athletic-facilities-expenses-20151222-story.html.  
     81 See David Sirota & Andrew Perez, College Football: Public Universities Spend Millions on Stadiums, 
Despite Slim Chance for Payoff, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.ibtimes.com/college-football-
public-universities-spend-millions-stadiums-despite-slim-chance-2258669.  
     82 See NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY SPORTS, https://web.archive.org/web/20190420200000/https://sports.usatoday. 
com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited July 5, 2020). 
     83 Id. 
     84 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 476 (1992). 
     85 Tony Manfred, The Todd Gurley Autograph Scandal Is Everything That’s Wrong with the NCAA, BUS. 
INSIDER, (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/todd-gurley-autograph-scandal-2014-10.  
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selling a commemorative bowl jersey for $1,000.86 The list of suspensions for 
relative pittances of money is nearly endless, and each suspension simply 
reinforces the extremely punitive nature of the NCAA regulations. Since there 
is no paid alternative to the NCAA with a comparable athletic infrastructure, the 
only way for a college athlete to maintain his value to future employers is to 
stay on the field and continue to produce. As such, an NCAA suspension for 
impermissible benefits undermines an athlete’s chances at receiving 
compensation from a professional employer. If approached by the FCL, an 
athlete would have to weigh the compensation offered by the FCL against the 
enormous switching cost associated with a finding of ineligibility by the NCAA. 
As noted before, the athletic infrastructure of the FCL would likely be a serious 
downgrade compared with the infrastructure the NCAA currently has in place. 
In all likelihood, a rational athlete would choose to forego wages in an effort to 
maintain eligibility and access to the NCAA infrastructure in lieu of wages and 
an uncertain or lesser infrastructure from the FCL. In essence, the draconian 
eligibility standards, combined with the NCAA’s hegemony and athletic 
infrastructure, create such a high exit barrier that college athletes would likely 
forego an offer of current compensation, lest the inability to access the NCAA’s 
infrastructure destroy the athletes’ future wage-earning potential. In the 
NCAA’s student-athlete model, they get athletes both coming and going. 
     To summarize, NCAA regulations create two entry barriers into the college-
level athlete market due to the disparity in labor costs and enormous initial 
outlay expense needed to create a sufficient athletic infrastructure. Similarly, 
those same eligibility regulations place an enormous switching cost on college 
athletes, creating an exit barrier and forcing college-level athletes to forgo even 
the smallest amounts of compensation.  
II. THE NCAA’S ALLEGED PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS DO NOT        
OUTWEIGH THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF ITS EXCLUSIONARY ACTS 
 
     If an anticompetitive effect has been demonstrated, then the monopolist can 
proffer a procompetitive justification for its conduct.87 “If the monopolist asserts 
a procompetitive justification--a non-pretextual claim that its conduct is indeed 
a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater 
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal--then the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to rebut that claim.”88 The balancing of the anticompetitive effect and 
 
     86 Associated Press, Georgia Star Receiver A.J. Green Suspended 4 Games for Selling Bowl Jersey for 
$1,000, FOX NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.foxnews.com/sports/georgia-star-receiver-a-j-green-
suspended-4-games-for-selling-bowl-jersey-for-1000.  
     87 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak, 504 
U.S. at 483. 
     88 Id. 
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procompetitive justifications is akin to the rule of reason test used for Sherman 
Act § 1 claims.89 The analysis is solely concerned with whether the conduct 
promotes competition; other factors are relevant only to the extent that those 
factors impact the competitive consequences.90 
     The NCAA recently defended itself against antitrust claims in O’Bannon, 
where the NCAA’s regulations and use of student-athletes likeness were 
challenged as anticompetitive conduct.91 In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit 
considered two of the procompetitive justifications offered by the NCAA for its 
restraints on student-athlete compensation as viable: that integrating academics 
and athletics improves “the quality of educational services provided to student-
athletes”92 and “that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their 
appeal to consumers.”93 The NCAA recently faced another antitrust claim on 
behalf of former NCAA student-athletes challenging the anticompetitive nature 
of the NCAA regulations capping athlete compensation to the grant-in-aid 
amount.94 In the NCAA’s brief for the In re: NCAA Grant-in-aid case, the same 
procompetitive justifications are offered.95 
     In short, the Ninth Circuit held that the preservation of amateurism was a 
sufficient justification to uphold the NCAA’s compensation restrictions, so long 
as the grant-in-aid rules gave student-athletes the full cost of attendance: “The 
Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA permit its schools to provide up to the 
cost of attendance to their student athletes. It does not require more.”96  
However, when applying the NCAA’s boilerplate procompetitive justification 
to the anticompetitive conduct described in this paper, the outcome is clear: the 
anticompetitive effect of the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme does far more 
to destroy competition than to promote it.  
     First, the integration of academics and athletics is not a sufficient justification 
on its face. The quality of educational services provided to the student-athlete 
or the general relationship between student-athletes and other students are not 
relevant factors; justifications based on considerations other than effect on 
 
     89 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911). 
     90 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
     91 See generally O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
     92 Id. at 1059. 
     93 Id. at 1073. 
     94 See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:2014-md-02541 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
18, 2014). 
     95 See Defendants’ Closing Brief, In Re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:2014-
md-02541 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2018).  The student plaintiffs obtained a limited permanent injunction 
prohibiting the NCAA from “agreeing to fix or limit compensation or benefits related to education.”  
Permanent Injunction, In Re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:2014-md-02541 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019).  
     96 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.  (showing the Northern District of California recently expanded upon 
O’Bannon and determined that the preservation of amateurism cannot justify restrictions on compensation or 
benefits related to education.). 
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competition, like improved quality, do not impact the analysis.97 Even if, as the 
Ninth Circuit mistakenly found, that integration of academics and athletes to 
improve educational experience was a valid procompetitive justification, the 
positive impact on competition would not exist. Such a justification does not 
reduce the entry barriers for competitors, it does not lower the price of 
purchasing college-level athletics to consumers, and it does not reduce the 
probability that the NCAA will continue to recoup monopoly profits. As such, 
the proffered procompetitive justification of integration does not outweigh (or 
impact at all) the anticompetitive harm caused by the NCAA’s exclusionary cost 
scheme. 
     Second, the amateur nature of college athletics increasing its popularity 
amongst consumers, while a stronger facial contention than the integration 
argument, nonetheless fails as a sufficient procompetitive justification. 
Assuming that the amateur nature of college athletics has a positive impact on 
demand (despite the dubious quality of the evidence used in the O’Bannon case), 
that positive impact misses the point of the analysis. As outlined above, the 
NCAA is currently the only supplier of college-level athletics. The amount of 
extra demand that the NCAA creates through the preservation of amateur 
athletics does not imply that competition has been benefited. Instead, the 
increased demand in a monopsony market merely causes the NCAA to reap 
higher monopoly profits. By utilizing an exclusionary cost scheme to “preserve 
amateurism,” the NCAA can maintain a monopoly price while simultaneously 
increasing demand. Rather than greater competition, the only impact the 
allegedly procompetitive justification has is greater profits. Much like the 
integration justification, the amateurism justification does not solve or lessen 
the anticompetitive effect of the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme. In fact, one 
can argue that the procompetitive justification actually worsens the 
anticompetitive effect of the scheme. 
     Much like the Board of Regents case, the O’Bannon case relies upon 
outdated policy views on the value that amateurism and the student-athlete 
model provide: “The difference between offering student-athletes education-
related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational 
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no 
basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.”98 
Both the Ninth Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s views on the principle of 
amateurism seem to be clouded by a perception that amateurism, in and of itself, 
is a noble goal and worthy of preservation. However, that reasoning misses the 
mark entirely. The value of amateurism as a societal principle has no bearing 
on the competitive benefit or harm caused by the preservation of that principle. 
 
     97 Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–94 (1978). 
     98 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. 
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As the Ninth Circuit points out, once student-athletes are paid compensation for 
their wages, there would be “no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism.”99 
The response to that concern, as far as antitrust analysis is concerned, is “so 
what?” The Sherman Act was not designed or intended to protect amateurism, 
only competition. If the principle of amateurism destroys competition more than 
it promotes competition, then that principle, when used in conjunction with 
monopoly power, is a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, the NCAA’s 
exclusionary cost scheme, which already relies upon the amateur status of its 
athletes to maintain monopoly power, is not saved by the alleged virtue of 
amateurism.  
 
III. THE SPONSORSHIP MODEL WOULD INCREASE COMPETITION IN THE 
MARKET BY ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND THEREBY LOWERING 
PRICES TO CONSUMERS 
 
     Since the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme violates antitrust law, a new 
model must be instituted to replace the student-athlete model and to promote 
competition in the college-level athlete market. One simple, procompetitive 
model can be implemented with ease: the sponsorship model.  
     If the courts view the principle of amateurism as an idea worth preserving, 
then the sponsorship model can provide a new system that maintains (to some 
extent) the ideal of amateurism while promoting competition. Rather than 
barring athletes from receiving any compensation beyond the grant-in-aid 
requirement, the NCAA regulations could be modified to allow third-party 
companies (i.e., Nike, Under Armour, Adidas, etc.) to compensate athletes 
through sponsorship deals. Not all college athletes would receive sponsorship 
deals, and those athletes would thus still be operating as an “amateur” as defined 
under the old student-athlete model. At the same time, the third-party entities, 
operating in an open market, would compensate athletes with sponsorship deals 
commiserate with their market value. Additionally, the college-level athletes 
would be permitted to participate and compete in third-party sponsored events 
with other college-level athletes. Such a model reduces the anticompetitive 
effect of the old student-athlete model in two ways. 
     First, the entry barriers and switching costs would be mitigated if not 
eliminated outright. Rather than having to pay all the wages for the athletes, the 
third-party sponsors are simply granting additional compensation to specific 
athletes while the member universities still provide the grant-in-aid amounts. 
Similarly, the third-party sponsors would not need to create an athletic 
infrastructure; the athletes can still use the NCAA’s infrastructure for NCAA 
competitions. Any third-party sponsored competitions would only need to rent 
 
     99 Id. 
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out arenas or stadiums on a per-event basis, significantly lowering the initial 
outlay costs. In the same vein, the exit barriers or switching costs under the 
student-athlete model would no longer exist; if a third-party offers 
compensation in the form of a sponsorship, the athlete can accept with no 
negative consequences. 
     Second, the price consumers must pay for college-level athletics would 
decrease with the increase in providers of college athletics. Third-party sponsors 
can pick specific athletes and market a particular niche brand of college-level 
athletics (i.e., the Nike All-Star League or the Under Armour Freshman 
League). The variety and increased availability, as well as the lower costs 
associated with the sponsorship model, would provide media rights buyers and 
ticket purchasers more options at lower price levels. The monopoly profits the 
NCAA obtained under the student-athlete model would now be disbursed 
amongst consumers and athletes. 
     In the event that the sponsorship model does not lead to the positive 
competition outcomes listed above, then a more drastic (but more consistent 
with a competitive market) model can be implemented: the professional model. 
Essentially, the professional model rejects all NCAA regulations on external 
compensation, creating an entirely open market for college-level athletes. 
Rather than bemoaning the conversion of college athletics into a professional 
“minor league,”100 the change should be embraced as the natural progression of 
a truly competitive market. Given that the appeal of college athletics is based 
mostly on the consumer’s affiliation with the university rather than 
amateurism,101 the negative impact that the destruction of amateurism has on the 
demand for NCAA athletics would be outweighed by the proliferation of 
competitors in the college-level athletics market (given that the NCAA’s 
exclusionary cost scheme would collapse in such a scenario). In other words, 
the number of consumers who would refuse to watch any college-level athletics 
that do not adhere to the principle of amateurism would probably be outweighed 
by the number of new consumers drawn in by the proliferation of competitors.    
     Both the sponsorship model and the professional model are far more 
consistent with the Sherman Act than the student-athlete model. The only 
negative, from the courts’ perspective, comes from the disintegration of the 
principle of amateurism. However, if amateurism must die so that competition 
can live, then the principle of amateurism must give way. The only barrier to 
the implementation of the procompetitive sponsorship or professional models is 
a misguided policy judgement on the value of amateurism. 
 
 
     100 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (1984). 
     101 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059. 
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CONCLUSION: THE NCAA HAS VIOLATED AND IS CURRENTLY VIOLATING 
THE SHERMAN ACT 
 
     Little argument can be made that the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme (and 
other exclusionary acts) have an anticompetitive effect; the leading NCAA cases 
go out of their way to note that the NCAA has monopoly power and has used 
that power in an anticompetitive way. At the same time, those cases tout the 
benefits of amateurism as a totem to ward off antitrust claims. Despite the 
obvious monopoly profits, entry barriers, and exclusionary tactics, the NCAA 
remains mostly immune from the Sherman Act.  
     Of course, the judges deciding these cases all went to college; they likely 
have fond memories of cheering on their college teams in a variety of sports. 
However, those rose-tinted glasses should not blind the courts to the 
anticompetitive nature of the NCAA. When the NCAA espouses the virtue of 
amateurism, or the virtue of working without pay, on the one hand, and 
denounces the scourge of compensation, while gorging on hundreds of millions 
in profit, on the other, any procompetitive justifications ring hollow.  
     In summation, the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme violates § 2 of the 
Sherman Act by accruing monopoly power through plainly anticompetitive acts 
that benefit only the profits of the monopolist. No efficiency or pro-competitive 
justifications offered by the NCAA are sufficient to outweigh the 
anticompetitive harm caused by the NCAA’s monopoly. The only rationale 
remaining is a flawed policy on the value of amateurism, a consideration that 
has no place in antitrust analysis. The NCAA is a monopolist that jealously 
wields its monopoly power to eliminate competition and increase profits at the 
expense of the consumer and the athletes. Ending the NCAA’s monopoly is 
right, both legally and as a matter of just policy. 
